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Abstract: Up to 25 percent of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
are caused by deforestation, and Indonesia is the third largest greenhouse gas 
emitter worldwide due to land use change and deforestation. On the island 
of Sulawesi in the vicinity of the Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP), many 
smallholders contribute to conversion processes at the forest margin as a 
result of their agricultural practices. Specifically the area dedicated to cacao 
plantations has increased from zero (1979) to nearly 18,000 hectares (2001). 
Some of these plots have been established inside the 220,000 hectares of the 
LLNP. An intensification process is observed with a consequent reduction of 
the shade tree density.
This study assesses which impact carbon sequestration payments for forest 
management systems have on the prevailing land-use systems. Additionally, the 
level of incentives is determined which motivates farmers to desist from further 
deforestation and land use intensification activities. Household behaviour and 
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resource allocation is analysed with a comparative static linear programming 
model. As these models are used as a tool for policy analysis, the output can 
indicate the adjustments in resource allocation and land use shifts when introducing 
compensation payments. 
The data were collected in a household survey in six villages around the LLNP. 
Four household categories are identified according to their dominant agroforestry 
systems. These range from low intensity management with a high degree of 
shading to highly intensified systems with no shade cover. 
At the plot level, the payments required for inducing the adoption of more 
sustainable land use practices are the highest for the full shade cacao agroforestry 
system, but with low carbon prices of €5 tCO2e–1 these constitute 5 percent of the 
cacao gross margin. Focusing on the household level, however, an increase up to 
18 percent of the total gross margin can be realised. Furthermore, for differentiated 
carbon prices up to €32 tCO2e–1 the majority of the households have an incentive 
to adopt the more sustainable shade intensive agroforestry system. Additionally, 
the results show that the deforestation activities of most households could be 
stopped with current carbon prices. 
Keywords: Avoided deforestation, cacao, carbon sequestration, economic 
incentives, linear programming, Lore Lindu National Park, payments for 
environmental services
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1. Introduction
The net global change in forest area has been slowing down from –8.9 million 
hectares per year in the 1990s to –7.3 million hectares during the last years due to 
plantations and restoration of degraded land, especially in Europe, North America 
and East Asia. However, primary forests are still lost or modified at a rate of six 
million hectares per year because of selective logging or deforestation, and there 
is no indication that the rate is slowing (FAO 2006). Deforestation in turn plays an 
important role in the global warming process, as it accounts for up to 25 percent of 
global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007). Indonesia has the second highest 
annual net loss in forest area worldwide. Between 2000 and 2005 two percent 
of its remaining forest area was lost every year (FAO 2006). Additionally, it is 
among the top three greenhouse gas emitters, primarily because of deforestation, 
peatland degradation and forest fires. 
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Deforestation is a difficult issue to tackle on a national scale, as its drivers 
are complex. Five broad categories can be determined as its underlying driving 
forces. These are demographic, economic, technological, policy, and institutional 
and cultural factors. In general, at the proximate level infrastructure extension, 
agricultural expansion, as well as wood extraction are the main driving forces 
for tropical deforestation and land use change (Geist et al. 2002). The majority of 
deforestation incidences are connected to agricultural expansion. The incentive 
for forest conversion for many smallholders can be attributed to the fact that 
other land uses such as permanent cropping, cattle ranching, shifting cultivation, 
and colonization agriculture yield higher revenues than forestry. Through their 
traditional land use practices, smallholders often contribute to deforestation 
processes. Hence, local emissions of carbon are affected and carbon stocks and 
associated fluxes are often negatively influenced. In the Kyoto Protocol, forestry 
activities, or so-called carbon sink projects1 are recognized as an important means 
of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, since carbon dioxide is removed through 
photosynthesis. Thus, forestry projects which result in additional greenhouse gases 
being actively sequestered from the atmosphere and stored in sinks can generate 
certified emission reductions (CER).2 In order to create a homogenous tradable 
commodity, emission reductions of any greenhouse gas are traded in form of 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) which means that the climate change 
potential of each greenhouse gas is expressed as an equivalent of the climate 
change potential of CO2 (UNFCCC 1997). Under the current rules established for 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),3 only afforestation and reforestation 
activities are considered eligible. However, in the on-going climate discussions, 
as during the UNFCCC Climate Conference in Bali in 2007, other sink activities, 
such as reducing emissions from deforestation or “compensated reduction” are 
high on the political agenda. This discussion was first initiated by the Rainforest 
Coalition, a group of developing nations with rainforest who formally offered 
voluntary carbon emission reductions by conserving forests in exchange for access 
to international markets for emissions trading. Especially the forest-rich countries, 
such as Brazil and Indonesia, are pushing for a financial acknowledgement of 
forest conservation. 
On the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia the forest margin of the Lore 
Lindu National Park (LLNP), which covers 220,000 hectares, has been facing 
1
 The term carbon sinks is applied to pools or reservoirs, such as forests, oceans and soils, which 
absorb carbon, and for which carbon storage exceeds carbon release. The process of capturing carbon 
from the atmosphere and storing it in vegetation biomass is referred to as sequestration.
2
 The terms certificates, carbon credits and CER are used interchangeably. One credit is the equiva-
lent of one tonne of CO2 emissions.
3
 For fulfilling the reduction obligations, the Kyoto Protocol offers three flexible mechanisms, 
 namely Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the CDM. The CDM provides for Annex I Par-
ties (most OECD countries and countries in transition) to implement projects that reduce emissions in 
non-Annex I countries in return for CER, and assist the host Parties in achieving sustainable develop-
ment. The CERs can be used by Annex I countries to help meet their emission targets (FAO 2004).
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encroachment and consequently deforestation. The main activities to be observed 
are an expansion of the area dedicated to agricultural activities by 20 percent 
during the last two decades, the tripling of the perennial crop plantations area and 
expansion into former forest areas, as well as selective and clear-cut logging. A 
village survey in 2001 revealed that 70 percent of the villages bordering the LLNP 
have agricultural land inside the park (Maertens 2003). A satellite image analysis 
detected a mean annual deforestation rate of 0.3 percent in the research region 
between 1983 and 2002 (Erasmi and Priess 2007). However, cacao plantations 
under shade trees cannot be detected by optical satellite instruments, thus the 
encroachment process at the forest margin is not fully reflected by this figure. In 
the vicinity of the LLNP a great spatial heterogeneity of agricultural production is 
apparent. In general, human activities are much more concentrated in the northern 
and western part of the park than in the south. In the north-east the closed forest 
decreased by 35 percent between 2001 and 2004 due to logging, whereas the area 
covered by cacao plantations increased by 11 percent (Rohwer 2006). In addition, 
an intensification process among the cacao agroforestry systems (AFS), whereby 
farmers gradually reduce the shade tree cover, can be observed. The focus of 
the present research is therefore twofold. We assess the impact of payments for 
carbon sequestration activities on the land use systems of smallholders in the 
regions bordering the LLNP in Indonesia, and whether such payments can provide 
an incentive for the adoption of more sustainable and shade tree covered land use 
practices and contribute to the conservation of the rainforest.
2. Framework
The research is motivated by the need to understand which level of incentives is 
required to stimulate the farmers to desist from further deforestation and land use 
intensification activities. Internationally the awareness for the requirement to develop 
and support payment mechanisms and incentives for the provision and preservation 
of environmental services is growing. Initiatives and projects are promoted where 
local actors are given payments in return for switching to more sustainable land-
use practices and ecosystem protection. They usually imply the payments to be 
made by the beneficiaries of the environmental services. These payments for 
environmental services (PES) policies have been defined by Wunder (2007), as 
voluntary, conditional agreements between at least one seller and one buyer over 
a well-defined environmental service – or a land use presumed to produce that 
service. Carbon sequestration is a typical positive externality, as it is an unplanned 
side effect of sustainable forest management and conservation in a specific area, and 
the benefits are not confined locally, but accrue to all of humanity. 
PES, being market-based mechanisms, can render forestry to be a competitive 
land use and farmers and loggers might decide to change their land use practices 
to retain or replant trees if they receive sufficient remuneration. In the case of 
deforestation avoidance, farmers can receive a compensation payment as an 
incentive not to cut down the forest and use the timber or put the land to agricultural 
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use. This is in line with the “compensated reduction” proposal, according to which 
countries electing to reduce their national emissions from deforestation would be 
authorized to issue carbon certificates which could be sold to governments or 
private investors to fulfil their emission targets (Santilli et al. 2005). 
In the region around the LLNP four cacao AFS can be distinguished according 
to the species type of shade trees and their canopy cover proportion, as well as 
the management intensity: AFS I exhibits a high degree of shading with natural 
forest trees with a canopy cover above 85 percent and they are managed with very 
few agricultural inputs; AFS II is shaded by a diverse spectrum of planted trees 
and naturally grown after clear-cutting, it has a shade cover of approximately 
66–85 percent; AFS III exhibits a low density of a shade tree layer, which 
is dominated by the non-indigenous leguminous trees Gliricida sepium and 
Erythrina subumbrans, with a canopy cover between 36–65  percent; finally, the 
AFS IV has very few to no shade trees (5–35  percent shade canopy cover) and 
is intensively managed. The forest and the cacao agroforestry systems provide a 
variety of goods and services such as non-timber forest products, watershed and 
pollination services (Priess et al. 2007). The gross margins of cacao consistently 
increase along the cacao AFS gradient from I towards IV. There seems to be a 
trade-off situation between an intensification of the cacao cultivation with shade 
free plantations and higher economic returns and shade-grown, low intensity 
management cacao with lower returns and biodiversity conservation. Even though 
the cacao grown in full sun has higher mean yields and obtains substantially 
higher gross margin values in comparison with shade grown cacao, in the long 
run the intensification is likely to be ecologically unsustainable. Results from 
studies show that tree crops which are grown in shaded systems tend to maintain 
productivity in the long run and are less susceptible to insect and disease losses 
than full-sun monocultures (Belsky and Siebert 2002; Young 1989). Reducing 
shade often implies an increase in yields, but increases physiological stress, 
the susceptibility to pests and diseases and thus, the amount of inputs required 
(Y. Clough, personal communication). Previous research in the same region indi-
cates that shaded AFSs provide high biodiversity values and habitat for the native 
fauna, whereas completely shade free systems harbour significantly lower species 
richness (Schulze et al. 2004). Similarly, studies with other perennial crops indicate 
that at the transition from shaded agroforestry systems to intensively managed 
shade free monocultures, a major loss of overall biodiversity occurs (Perfecto et 
al. 1996). The species-richness of plants, animals and ecosystem functioning of the 
AFS was assessed in a multi-disciplinary study by (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). 
They did not discover a linear gradient of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning 
loss from the first to the third AFS, but deduced that the complete reduction of 
shade trees as a consequence of the land use intensification is an ecologically 
unsustainable path and results in disproportionate ecological losses in the long 
run. Unfortunately, the intensification process already takes place in the region. 
A willingness to pay study, which suggests a higher preference for low shade 
AFS among the local farmers, supports these results (Glenk et al. 2006). Thus, 
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to prevent an intensification of the AFS to monocultures in the region, economic 
incentives are required. These could be price premiums, as they are already 
available for a long time for fair trade and organic coffee. Recently premiums 
have been introduced for fair trade and organic cocoa. The fair trade premium 
for standard quality cocoa is €100 per tonne. Also for organic cocoa producers 
receive a higher price which ranges between €75 to 225 per tonne (ICCO 2007). 
Alternatives could also be price premiums offered through carbon certificates to 
provide an incentive for the more shade grown, biodiversity rich and sustainable 
cacao AFS and slow down the intensification process. 
An important phenomenon in the region is that many Bugi households settled 
in the 1990s from South Sulawesi and Poso into the research area and started to buy 
land from the local Kaili households. In many cases the local ethnic households 
had originally obtained this land by clearing primary forest on the border of the 
National Park (Faust et al. 2003). They consider themselves to be the owners of 
the village territory and do not see the necessity to buy land, but in turn realise 
the opportunity to generate additional income by selling parts of their land. This 
provokes a vicious cycle, because after a while the local households spend the 
income gained through the land sales on ceremonial purposes or status symbols. 
In due course, when they are short of money again, they convert further forest to 
satisfy their financial needs.
Incentive-based schemes have become very common during the last decade, 
and throughout the world hundreds of new and very elaborate PES initiatives 
have been implemented. For example, in Costa Rica the National Fund for Forest 
Financing operates a scheme which bundles funding from various sources, 
including international donors, carbon buyers, the Costa Rican public through 
a national fuel tax, and local industries interested in water quality and flows. 
Consequently, land users can receive payments for specified land uses, such as new 
plantations, sustainable logging, and conservation of natural forests. In Mexico, a 
payment for a hydrological environmental services programme is carried out. In 
Asia one of the most prominent programmes is RUPES (Rewarding the Upland 
Poor for Ecosystem Services). In one of these projects in Indonesia farmers are 
assisted to obtain conditional land tenure in exchange for adopting mixed agro-
forestry systems that increase erosion control and biodiversity (Jack et al. 2007). 
For avoided deforestation projects the main sources of funding are from voluntary 
sources, but also the World Bank provides through its newly established Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility additional financial resources.
A great variety of studies have been conducted employing different methods 
and considering the supply and/or the demand side aspects to determine the 
value of environmental services as done by Antle et al. (2007), Olschweski and 
Benítez (2005) and Pattanayak (2004). The challenge, however, remains to find 
the specific price at which the marginal cost of the payment equals the marginal 
benefit of the behaviour that it stimulates. The prices for carbon certificates 
fluctuate widely, depending on the type of certificate, whether it is an emission 
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reduction generated through a project-based activity, such as CER, or allowance 
based transactions, allocated under existing cap-and-trade regimes, such as the EU 
allowances. Additionally, the voluntary greenhouse gas emission offset markets 
are evolving rapidly, especially in the United States. Looking at permanent CER, 
a wide variation of prices can be observed. In 2006 certificates were traded in a 
range between €5 up to €21.50 per tCO2e, with an average of €10.90 (Capoor and 
Ambrosi 2007). 
Accordingly, we investigate whether current carbon credit prices are sufficient 
on the one hand to induce farmers to adopt more sustainable land use practices and 
on the other hand to make them desist from further forest conversion activities. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an insight into whether environmental service 
payment schemes could have an impact on land use changes, and specifically 
which level of incentives would be necessary for the currently demanded policies 
to reduce emissions from deforestation, and thus, contribute to the conservation 
of the rainforest.   
3. Data and methods
3.1. Linear programming model
We chose a comparative static linear programming model to analyse the behaviour 
of the households and their resource allocation. These models simulate the farmers’ 
reaction to interventions and the effect of technology changes on economic 
decisions about natural resource use management (Barbier and Bergeron 1999; 
Bertomeu et al. 2006; Mudhara et al. 2003). Linear programming has been used 
by several authors as a method for studying the impact of policy activities (Vosti 
et al. 2002), such as in this case carbon payments. As with all methods, there are 
some limitations, such as the assumption of certain values and preferences when 
specifying the objective function, the possibility of non-linearity and feedback 
between variables, as well as the dynamics of systems. While one has to be aware 
of these problems, for the purpose of this research linear programming has been 
considered an appropriate method. It is a useful technique to assess technology 
changes or adoption potentials ex ante, so that careful planning for new policies 
or strategies can be undertaken. As an input for the model, the gross margins 
for the main cropping activities paddy rice, upland rice, maize and cocoa were 
calculated. Additionally, forest conversion activities based on various economic-
political-environmental parameters from the research region were included 
to portray the behaviour of the smallholders as realistically as possible. Given 
the objective function, the solution procedure maximises the total gross margin 
(TGM) of the farm by finding the optimal set of activities for the household type, 
under the respective restrictions such as farm size, suitability of the land for 
various crops, food security, the credit limit, family work force, and the seasonal 
peak requirement of labour for each activity. The credit limit is the maximum 
amount of credit that a household expects to be able to borrow from formal and 
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informal sources (Diagne and Zeller 2001). The farm conditions are stable, thus 
time dimensions are not included in the model. In the research region most of the 
agroforestry plots contain trees of mixed age, therefore there is no clearly defined 
investment period and time of returns. Hence, the time lag between investment 
and returns has been ignored, as there are always some trees which can already 
be harvested whilst the others still mature. Furthermore, initial investment costs 
are very low and the additional labour in the first three unproductive years of 
the cacao tree cannot be clearly separated from other activities necessary for the 
already productive trees on the cacao plots. As the farmer has information about 
alternative production activities and input and output prices, risk does not need to 
be accounted for  (Vosti et al. 2002). In another study in the same region which 
focused on smallholder cacao farmers’ technology adoption, application and 
optimisation, the same conditions apply and similar assumptions were used for the 
linear programming model (Taher 1996). In Appendix I the linear programming 
model for Household II is depicted.4 
3.2. Farm household types
The data on the existing agricultural production systems for the model were 
collected in a household survey in the surroundings of the LLNP in 2006. We 
categorised the households according to the dominant AFS among their cacao 
plots, and determined four corresponding household types (HHI–HHIV). A random 
sample of 46 households in six villages was drawn from the total sample of 325 
households in 13 villages from the research project. These had been randomly 
selected based on a stratified sampling method for a household survey in 2001 and 
2004. For the specific sampling procedure see (Zeller et al. 2002). The survey at 
hand focused on general aspects of the household and farm characteristics, land 
resources and their use, agricultural production activities, and forest usage. The 
four household types have different resource endowments, such as land and labour 
availability and credit limit. The major characteristics are presented in Table 1 to 
indicate the differences between them.
Thus, one can see that the household type I has the lowest credit limit and the 
least cultivated land. The main share of the land is dedicated to the cacao AFS I. 
Mainly the indigenous households own this plot type. Household types II and III 
have an increasing credit limit and most land available for cultivation, and they 
dedicate most of their land to AFS II and AFS II, respectively. In these household 
classes the share of migrants becomes more dominant. Household type IV, who 
is mainly non-indigenous, predominantly grows the intensively managed AFS IV. 
However, its credit limit is only the second highest and its land availability is the 
same as that of household type I. This could be an indication that with limited 
credit and land availability they adopt a more intensive production system in 
comparison to the other household types. With the help of a poverty assessment 
4
  Interested readers can contact the authors for further LP models and base data.
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tool based on principle component analysis (Zeller et al. 2006) the households in 
the region were classified into poverty groups according to their relative welfare. 
The poverty index allows grouping the households into terciles and makes it 
possible to draw comparisons between the poorest, poor and better-off households. 
67 percent of the type I households belong to the poorest households, whereas 63 
percent of the type IV households can be categorised as better off. The households 
of the two other categories fall into all three welfare groups. We note that there is 
a poverty gradient to be found from HHI towards HHIV.
3.3. Carbon accounting methodology
For carbon accounting the amount of carbon sequestration which is to be claimed 
as a credit is limited to the net amount of change in the total forest carbon pool 
from one period to the next. In order to obtain the site specific total above- and 
below-ground biomass for cacao trees, a logarithmic growth regression model 
was adopted. The biomass can then be converted to carbon using a conversion 
factor of 0.5 g of carbon respectively for 1 g of biomass (Brown 1997).  To obtain 
the tradable commodity CO2e, the conversion factor for carbon of 3.667 is used. 
The results show that for this specific region a cacao tree, on average, stores 
8.05 kg carbon over a time span of 25 years, with the more intensively managed 
and densely planted AFS IV accumulating more carbon (46 kg/ha) than the less 
intensively managed systems I–III (39 kg/ha). Additionally, 0.5 t ha–1 yr–1 of soil 
organic carbon was added, a figure from the literature (Hamburg 2000), as no site-
specific data exist. Due to lack of data, the calculation for carbon accumulation in 
soils is assumed to occur linearly in time.5 All carbon measurements for above-, 
5
 For comparison, the total carbon pool has also been calculated excluding soil carbon. As the 
 difference is quite small (3 percent decrease in annuity payment), it is assumed that it is acceptable 
to include soil carbon.
Table 1: Characteristics of household classes I–IV.
Household class
I II III IV
Total cultivated land (ha) 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.5
 Rice (ha) 0.18 0.18 0.10 0. 13
 Maize (ha) 0 0.012 0.012 0.38
 Cacao AFS I (ha) 1.49 0.24 0 0
 Cacao AFS II (ha) 0.77 1.31 1.09 0.33
 Cacao AFS III (ha) 0.25 1.16 1.73 0
 Cacao AFS IV (ha) 0.02 0 0 1.72
Family labour days per month 32.4 29.5 34.4 31.6
Credit limit (€/year) 33 720 1,015 570
Ethnicity (% non-indigenous HHs) 0 19 22 80
Poverty status Poorest Poor Poor Better-off
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below-ground and soil carbon were added up to obtain an estimate of the total 
carbon per hectare of the cacao trees. Finally, this amount was converted to CO2e, 
which is the basis to calculate the amount of certificates to be obtained for the 
different agroforestry systems.
According to the Kyoto protocol, all credits from sink projects have a 
temporary status and expire after a certain time. Only trees which are planted at 
the beginning of the crediting period can be assigned temporary certificates of 
emission reductions (tCER). A tCER is defined as a CER issued for an afforestation 
project activity under the CDM, which expires at the end of the commitment 
period following the one in which it is issued (UNFCCC 2003). The tCER are 
limited to five years, after which they can be re-issued. Once the tCER are not 
re-certified, a permanent solution is needed to fulfil the reduction requirements. 
To make things straightforward for this calculation, we assumed that the credits 
are synchronous with the commitment periods, so that they are issued at the end 
of the first commitment period and expire five years later at the end of the next 
commitment period (Dutschke and Schlamadinger 2003; Olschewski and Benitez 
2005). In addition, we argue that the annual net rate of carbon accumulation of the 
shading trees in the first three land-use systems should be accounted for. Otherwise 
there is a great incentive for purely sun grown cacao plantations, as these are more 
densely planted and hence, the total carbon accumulation per hectare is higher 
than in the more shade intensive AFS. This could even foster further cutting down 
of the shading trees. The carbon fixation of the shade trees has been estimated 
based on a study by Brown et al. (1996) and included in the carbon budget for the 
AFS I, II and III. The tCER for the first five year crediting period are related to 
the cumulative carbon storage of the AFS system. The first credits are generated 
after five years. These tCER expire after five years, but are reissued in year 10 
together with additional tCER. The same procedure is applied for the following 
5-year periods until the last issuance of tCER in year 25, and reflects the total net 
storage of CO2 since the project started. 
The prices for tCERs represent only a fraction of the prices for regular CERs 
from other project categories such as energy projects. Forestry certificates expire 
after a certain time period, so they are only allocated non-permanent certificates. 
These must be replaced by permanent ones at some point in the future, hence, the 
non-permanent credits need to be converted to permanent CER. Therefore, the 
value of the temporary credits can be seen as the difference between the current 
permanent credit price and the discounted value of the future permanent credit 
price: 
P = P
P
(1+d*)tCER CER
CER
T0 0
T
 
(1)
where P is the price, CER0 is the price of the CERs today and CERT the price of 
permanent CERs discounted at rate d*  found in Annex I-countries and T is the 
expiring time of tCER (Subak 2003). 
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For the conversion the CER prices are assumed to be constant over time 
(pCER0=pCERT), and a three percent discount rate (d*) is taken, which reflects the 
current low real interest rates in Annex I countries (Deutsche Bundesbank 2007). 
As a tCER has a duration of five years, its value according to the equivalence 
relation in (1) is only about 14 percent of that of a permanent credit.
The annual remuneration to the farmer was obtained for each land-use system 
through the calculation of the net present value, using equation (2), where d 
represents the discount rate in Indonesia and T the 5-year periods from year 5 
until 25. The calculations refer to the net carbon accumulation.
tCER d
d d
T⋅ +
+
+
+
−∑ ( ) ( )( )
( )
(1 1 1
2 5
5
2 10
=
net CO storage net CO storage
)
...
( )
( )
10
2 25
251
+ +
+
net CO storage
d
 
 
(2)
For the linear programming model the net present values are converted to annuities, 
in order to show the annual payments which the farmer would receive from a 
25 year sequestration project. The equivalent annuity method expresses the net 
present value as an annualised cash flow by dividing it by the present value of the 
annuity factor. The annuity factor is calculated according to formula (3), where 
i represents the interest rate and n the number of years. The real interest rate of 
10 percent is taken (Bank Indonesia 2006), and the time span is 25 years. Finally 
the annuity factor is multiplied by the net present value to obtain the annuity.
AF i (1 i)(1 i) 1n,i
n
n
= × +
+ −
 
(3)
4. Results
4.1. Carbon sequestration potential
At the plot level, the results indicate that the net carbon accumulation is the 
highest for both the most shade intensive agroforestry system I and for the shade 
free cacao plantation IV (67 tCO2e ha–1) in a 25 year project. The two other 
agroforestry systems II and III accumulate 64 and 62 tCO2e ha–1, respectively. 
The resulting payments for carbon sequestration in turn depend then on the net 
carbon accumulation, the expiring time of the tCER, the discount rates, the 
time span of the project, as well as on the CER prices. As mentioned above, the 
prices for permanent CER vary considerably on carbon markets; hence different 
prices are considered (Table 2) to indicate the range. A price of €5 tCO2e–1 is 
comparable to the lowest traded medium-risk CER price, whereas €25 tCO2e–1 at 
the other end represents the trading prices in the European Climate Exchange for 
2008–10 carbon allowances in May 2007.
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Table 2: Annuity payments for different prices of CER.
Annuity payments € ha–1 Agroforestry system
I II III IV
d 10%, CER €5 tCO2e–1   5.54   5.18   5.00   5.09
d 10%, CER €12 tCO2e–1 13.30 12.40 12.00 12.20
d 10%, CER €25 tCO2e–1 27.70 25.90 25.00 25.50
With low carbon credit prices of €5 tCO2e–1, the resulting annuity payments 
constitute 5 percent of the cacao gross margin for the high shade AFS (€100 ha–1), 
and <1 percent of the fully sun grown AFS cacao gross margin (€1,460 ha–1). At 
carbon credit prices of €25 tCO2e–1, the payments amount to 28 and 2 percent 
of the respective cacao gross margins. We can derive from the results, that the 
variation between the four AFS is not very pronounced. However, the highest 
annuity payments from carbon sequestration are always obtained for the high 
shade AFS and decline towards the AFS III. The AFS IV obtains payments in the 
mid-range, because the cacao trees are more densely planted in comparison to the 
other three shaded systems. 
In a village survey conducted in 80 of the 119 villages in the research area 
20,590 hectares were used for cacao plantations in 2007. Approximately 1 percent 
of this area was planted with the AFS type I, 31 percent with AFS II, 60 percent 
with AFS III and 8 percent with AFS IV (S. Reetz, personal communication). 
Thus, if a carbon sequestration project were to be implemented in this region, the 
approximate carbon offset potential of the cacao AFS would be 1,300,000 tCO2e–1, 
amounting to 3,855,699 tCER in 25 years. At low carbon prices of €5 tCO2e–1 
this would amount to an annuity payment of €104,000, at a price of €12 tCO2e–1 
to €250,000 and at €25 tCO2e–1 to €522,000 for a 25 year project. 
4.2. Baseline results
Focusing on the household level, the baseline TGMs of the crop activities were 
calculated (Table 3). As explained above, the cacao gross margins increase in 
profitability when moving along the cacao AFS intensification gradient from I 
towards IV. However, the farmers in the region do not only employ the AFS with 
the highest gross margin. There is a variety of complex factors and circumstances, 
which are not reflected in the model, such as the distance of the plot to the forest, 
traditional land use practices and cultural preferences, which play important 
roles in the households’ decisions with respect to their AFS. The farmers who 
predominantly grow the AFS I might not just be restricted because of labour, land 
and credit constraints to this land use system, but also because their cacao plot 
borders the forest and they also grow a variety of other tree crops on the same plot. 
Some farmers also are of the opinion that the shade trees prevent diseases from 
spreading. The baseline exhibits an increase of the TGM from crop activities from 
HHI towards HHIV. This result mirrors the poverty gradient, which was obtained 
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Table 3: Total gross margins for the household types for different CER price scenarios.
Total gross margin (€ yr–1) Household class
I II III IV
Baseline 375 1,063 1,331 2,705
Scenario 1 (CER €5) 389 1,076 1,344 2,715
Scenario 2 (CER €12) 408 1,094 1,361 2,729
Scenario 3 (CER €25) 443 1,128 1,393 2,756
when we categorised the households according to their relative welfare. Hence, it 
corroborates the fact that there seems to be a wealth gradient from household type 
I towards household type IV. 
4.3. Impact of changing prices of carbon and cocoa
The baseline model was compared with different scenarios which included the 
payments for carbon sequestration of the AFS. The impact of changing carbon 
credit prices is assessed with a constant discount rate of 10 percent (Table 3).  With 
the introduction of the payments, the HHI experiences the most pronounced relative 
impact on its TGM. When comparing the baseline situation with the different 
payments the total gross margin increases by 4, 9 and 18 percent respectively for 
the price scenarios 1, 2 and 3 (see Table 3). For household types II and III, the 
increase is smaller (between 1 and 6 (HHII) and 1 and 5 percent (HHIII)), whereas 
for household type IV the corresponding impact is almost negligible (between 0 
and 2 percent). When looking at the absolute impact of the carbon payments on 
the TGM in Table 3, household I receives the highest additional payments for all 
three CER prices, and the amounts gradually decline for HHII, HHIII and HHIV. At 
this range of carbon prices none of the households is induced to shift its land use 
management practices. 
Shifts in land-use are only observed if carbon prices for carbon sequestration 
of cacao trees are set at higher levels. The household type III starts to take up the 
AFS I once the carbon prices reach €55, and household type IV needs a carbon 
price of €238 to induce a change in its land-use practices, also shifting towards 
AFS I. Household type II only starts to realise any shifts in land-use activity when 
CER prices are at €600, switching towards AFS I and II. Interestingly, household 
type I does not realise any further shifts in land-use activities, since its land, labour 
and capital constraints are binding.
In January 2008, the world market FOB cocoa prices were at €1,755 per 
tonne (ICCO 2008). In general, there is a great price volatility to be observed on 
the cocoa market, as prices respond to supply and demand factors. In the 1970s 
prices experienced an important increase, after very low prices in the 1960s which 
encouraged production in Indonesia and Malaysia. In the 1980s prices declined 
again and even though they modestly recovered in the mid 1990s, they were 
still low at the turn of the century and only started to increase again in the last 
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few years. During the time of the survey in 2006, prices were about €1,240 per 
tonne. The lowest price was observed in 2001, when prices were at €768 per 
tonne (ICCO 2008). This means there has been an increase of 38 percent in world 
market prices of cocoa between 2001 and 2006. Thus, in scenario 4 we look at 
whether, with this low cocoa price as observed in the past, the carbon payments 
would actually cause a difference and induce any shift in land use activity or in 
the TGM. Considering the impact on land use activity, for household types I, III 
and IV no shift is to be observed, and the change in TGM ranges from 14 to 3 to 
2 percent respectively. However, HHII shifts its land use activities towards AFS I 
and II and realises an increase in its TGM of 93 percent. Summarising, for shifts 
in land use activities to occur, when all AFS receive equal payments, very high 
carbon credits would be necessary. Thus, we next assess whether shifts occur if 
explicit land use systems are targeted with payments.
4.4. Incentives for environmentally friendly agroforestry systems
In this section we assess whether carbon credits could be used as an incentive for 
the farmers if the credits are targeted only towards the two more shade intensive 
AFS, which have higher biodiversity and are more sustainable in the long run. 
Hence, using the reduced costs or opportunity costs of the different cacao AFS 
activities, the minimum prices for carbon certificates can be determined, which 
are needed for a specific activity to enter the farming plan. Therefore, in scenario 
5 we assess at which minimum credit price the household types would adopt the 
full shade AFS I or the slightly less shaded AFS II to slow down the intensification 
trends. The results indicate that household I needs a credit price of €14 to adopt 
more of the AFS I, household II is stimulated to shift more towards the fully shaded 
AFS with credit prices of €27 and household III adopts more AFS II with carbon 
credit prices of €32 tCO2e–1. These prices are in a range of CER to be observed 
on carbon markets currently and they are lower than the price premiums paid for 
organic cocoa. However, household IV would need very high credit prices of 
€185 tCO2e–1 to provide a sufficient incentive to adopt more of the less intensive 
cacao production practices. 
4.5. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
Nowadays on the climate change policies agenda avoided deforestation is 
increasingly discussed, since it can provide an important strategy for avoiding 
greenhouse gas emissions in the first place. In a study by Jung (2005) the estimates 
for the global potential for carbon uptake6 through avoided deforestation are 11 
times higher than for plantations, regeneration and agroforestry together. 
The discussion on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation (REDD) usually focuses on the national level. Yet incentives can also be 
6
 This does not represent the real carbon uptake but the one accounted for by the carbon accounting 
scheme used for forestry projects in the CDM.
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set at the local level, as agricultural activities are often a major driving force of 
conversion processes. Therefore, we used the linear programming model to deter-
mine the necessary carbon prices at which households stop deforestation activities 
at the forest margin of the LLNP. The prices we obtained show substantial differ-
ences between household types. Annual payments of €5 per hectare are necessary 
to stop conversion activities of household type I, whereas household type II would 
need annual payments of €125, household type III of €300 and household type IV 
of even €700. 
It depends on the future arrangements for payment modalities for emission 
reductions from avoided deforestation whether the above calculated payments can 
be made. Discussions are still on-going and evolve around up-front and annual 
payments, setting the year of the baseline etc. For this case study we appraise the 
feasibility of these compensation payments with a simple projection. The current 
estimate for the carbon content of the LLNP forest is 435 tCO2e ha–1 (M. Kessler, 
personal communication). Under the assumption that the current deforestation 
rate of 0.3 percent is reduced to 0, annual emissions of 13 tCO2e ha–1 could be 
avoided. Depending on the prices paid for avoided emissions from deforestation, 
payments between €65 and €326 per hectare could arise7 (see Table 4). Different 
scenarios are calculated with a safety margin of a 25 percent lower and a 10 
percent higher CO2e content of the forest, as it is not homogeneous over the 
entire Park area.
If the prices paid for every ton of CO2e avoided are €12, the evolving payments 
are sufficiently high enough to provide an incentive for the household types I 
and II to stop forest conversion activities. If the prices were increased to €25 
tCO2e–1 avoided, even the household type III – who needs a compensation of €300 
per hectare – could be stimulated to desist from further tree cutting. Household type 
I – which only cuts down a few original forest trees and sets seedlings under the 
remaining shade trees – obtains a much lower cacao gross margin and, hence, needs 
7
 Transaction costs are not considered, their inclusion would reduce the evolving payments.
Table 4: Scenarios of potential payments for avoided emissions from deforestation reduction.
Scenarios of different  
CO2e contents 
Low Middle High
Carbon content LLNP t CO2e ha–1 326 435 479
Annual emissions avoided (deforestation  
rate reduced from 0.3% to 0)
t CO2e ha–1 13   17   19
Payments for different prices per tCO2e avoided
   5 € tCO2e–1 € ha–1 49   65   72
 12 € tCO2e–1 € ha–1 117 157 172
 25 € tCO2e–1 € ha–1 245 326 359
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a much lower compensation payment to stop forest conversion. In comparison, the 
household type IV receives a very high gross margin for the intensively managed 
cacao. The need for these very high compensation payments arises through the 
opportunity costs of not converting forest which is the cacao gross margin.
As mentioned above, many of the local households are the drivers of the 
encroachment at the forest margin, selling the land to the newcomers who tend to 
have more intensively managed cacao AFS (see also Table 1). If the compensation 
payments would be specifically targeted towards the first two household types, 
who are mainly indigenous, a solution could be provided to stop this vicious circle 
of forest conversion.
5. Discussion
In the specific context of the Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi in 
Indonesia, the intensification process among the cacao production systems leads 
to a gradual removal of original forest shade trees towards fully sun grown 
monocultures. From this study we can derive that per hectare payments for carbon 
sequestration of cacao agroforestry systems are the highest for fully shaded land 
use systems, but in general hardly differ between the systems. Depending on the 
certificate prices, a farmer could obtain between €6 and €28 per hectare for the 
carbon sequestration of the cacao AFS. With low certificate prices of €5 tCO2e–1, 
the additional remuneration for the AFS in general is quite low, especially in 
comparison to the very high gross margin of €1,460 per hectare of the intensively 
managed cacao. However, with carbon certificate prices at the upper end, the 
households who obtain the lowest total gross margin from their crop activities can 
realise an 18 percent increase of their gross margin from cropping activities with 
the introduction of payments. These households also realise the highest increase 
in absolute terms of their gross margin. Additionally, these households provide 
the second highest (and only marginally lower than the highest) environmental 
benefit in terms of the annual carbon sequestration rate of their cacao agroforestry 
systems. Thus, carbon payments seem to have a positive impact on the income 
derived from cropping activities for the households which are the least well 
endowed with financial resources. The payments may additionally reduce the 
need of poor indigenous households to open up further land at the forest border 
and sell their land to the migrants.
On a regional scale for the research area there is a carbon offset potential 
of 1,300,000 tCO2e from all cacao plantations which in comparison to the 
BioCarbon Fund Projects of the World Bank would be in the upper range of their 
projects. This could lead to annual payments between €100,000 and €500,000 
from the carbon sequestration of the AFS. However, the limits for a small scale 
afforestation project under the CDM, which only allows for an annual average 
greenhouse gas removal by sinks of <16,000 tCO2e, would be exceeded. Such a 
small-scale project could be an option for the AFS type I farmers, as the smallest 
area share among the cacao plantations is planted with the full shade cacao (264 
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hectares), and they would only need to gather a total area of their shade intensive 
cacao agroforestry systems of 240 hectares.
Carbon certificates could also be used as a price premium to reward households 
to carry out less intensively managed land use practices. Results show that they can 
offer the possibility to provide an incentive for the majority of households to adopt 
more of the shade intensive AFS I and II. The analysis indicates that the farmers of 
the household types I–III would need differentiated prices to stimulate the switch 
towards the more sustainable land use systems, but that current prices which are 
observed on the carbon markets could doubtlessly be sufficient. Additionally, 
compensation payments can be used as an incentive for deforestation reduction, 
which ultimately leads to avoided greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis shows 
that the current carbon prices could be sufficient for three household types to 
stop them from further forest conversion, whereas the better off households need 
extremely high compensation payments, which could not be generated with the 
current prices for carbon certificates. The inherent problem is due to the fact that 
the fully sun grown cacao receives very high net-revenues, which makes it very 
difficult to provide viable and financially attractive alternative activities for these 
farmers. However, in the long run these systems will be not be sustainable and are 
likely to experience a decline in yields due to anticipated agronomic risks such as 
declining soil fertility.
6. Conclusion
If carbon payments are applied in general to all agroforestry systems there will 
not be such a great impact in terms of a contribution to environmental services. 
However, if other criteria, such as the provision of further environmental services 
are included, specific systems can be targeted in order to promote a switch 
towards these AFS. We conclude that for the carbon payments to be efficient and 
promote a shift towards land uses which provide higher environmental benefits, 
payments targeted towards medium to high shade intensive land use systems 
would be needed. This could ensure that the changes are made into the desired 
direction. Additionally, we have observed that the poorer households seem to 
benefit relatively more than the better off from carbon payments. It seems as if 
win-win situations are possible, where both deforestation processes and poverty 
can be reduced with carbon payments. 
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